

Nos. 04-1528 and 04-1530

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

NEIL RANDALL, *et al.*,
Petitioners,

v.

WILLIAM H. SORRELL, *et al.*,
Respondents.

VERMONT REPUBLICAN STATE COMMITTEE, *et al.*,
Petitioners,

v.

WILLIAM H. SORRELL, *et al.*,
Respondents.

**On Petitions for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit**

**BRIEF *AMICI CURIAE* OF SENATOR JOHN F. REED,
SENATOR ARLEN SPECTER, SENATOR MARIA E.
CANTWELL, SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD,
SENATOR RICHARD J. DURBIN, SENATOR
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, SENATOR CARL LEVIN,
SENATOR CHARLES E. SCHUMER IN SUPPORT
OF THE RESPONDENTS-CONDITIONAL CROSS
PETITIONERS AND THE RESPONDENT-
INTERVENORS-CONDITIONAL
CROSS PETITIONERS**

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	ii
INTEREST OF AMICI.....	1
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT	2
REASONS FOR GRANTING REVIEW	5
CONCLUSION	15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

<i>Buckley v. Valeo</i> , 424 U.S. 1 (1976)	<i>passim</i>
<i>Burroughs v. United States</i> , 290 U.S. 534 (1934)	11
<i>Burson v. Freeman</i> , 504 U.S. 191 (1992)	5, 11, 12
<i>California Medical Ass’n v. FEC</i> , 453 U.S. 182 (1981).....	13
<i>City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.</i> , 475 U.S. 41 (1986).....	6, 7, 10
<i>Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC</i> , 518 U.S. 604 (1996)	14, 15
<i>Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC</i> , 518 U.S. 727 (1996)	11
<i>FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee</i> , 533 U.S. 431 (2001)	3
<i>FEC v. National Right To Work Committee</i> , 459 U.S. 197 (1982).....	13
<i>Homans v. City of Albuquerque</i> , 366 F.3d 900 (10th Cir.), <i>cert. denied</i> , 125 S. Ct. 625 (2004)	2
<i>Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez</i> , 372 U.S. 144 (1963).....	4
<i>Kruse v. City of Cincinnati</i> , 142 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1998)	2
<i>McConnell v. FEC</i> , 540 U.S. 93 (2003).....	3, 8
<i>Munro v. Socialist Workers Party</i> , 479 U.S. 189 (1986).....	12

<i>Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC</i> , 528 U.S. 377 (2000).....	3, 7, 13, 14
<i>Suster v. Marshall</i> , 149 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 1998)	2
<i>Texas v. Johnson</i> , 491 U.S. 397 (1989)	6
<i>Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC</i> , 512 U.S. 622 (1994).....	4, 7, 8
<i>Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC</i> , 520 U.S. 180 (1997).....	7
<i>United States v. International Union United Automobile Workers of America</i> , 352 U.S. 567 (1957).....	9
<i>United States v. O'Brien</i> , 391 U.S. 367 (1968).....	7
<i>United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers</i> , 413 U.S. 548 (1973).....	10, 11
<i>Ward v. Rock Against Racism</i> , 491 U.S. 781 (1989) ..	4, 6, 8

MISCELLANEOUS

Vincent A. Blasi, <i>Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate The First Amendment After All</i> , 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1281 (1994)	9
E. Joshua Rosenkranz, <i>Buckley Stops Here: Loosening the Judicial Stranglehold on Campaign Finance Reform</i> (1998)	8
David Schultz, <i>Proving Political Corruption: Documenting the Evidence Required to Sustain Campaign Finance Reform Laws</i> , 18 Rev. Litig. 85 (Winter 1999).....	9

INTEREST OF AMICI

Amici, Senator John F. Reed, Senator Arlen Specter, Senator Maria E. Cantwell, Senator Christopher J. Dodd, Senator Richard J. Durbin, Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Senator Carl Levin, Senator Charles E. Schumer are a bipartisan group of United States Senators.¹ The personal experiences of *amici*, as candidates and members of Congress, since this Court's decision in *Buckley* demonstrate the need for clearer and more comprehensive authority to vindicate the central premise in *Buckley*—that the government has a compelling interest in ensuring faith in the integrity of the political process. *Amici* advocate, and seek to enact, reforms to vindicate that compelling interest. As both elected representatives and seasoned participants in the electoral process, *amici* believe they are entitled to broad deference in the regulation of federal elections. The Court in *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), properly accorded legislatures such deference with regard to contribution limits. The Court should clarify that equivalent deference is warranted with respect to the expenditure limits at issue here and extend it to campaign finance reforms in general. Without additional reforms, the public faith's and participation in the political process will continue to decline. Such reforms can be enacted without infringing upon First Amendment rights and without stifling the public debate essential to the functioning of our democracy. Indeed, such reforms will enhance the public debate that is the foundation of our democratic process.

¹ No person or entity other than *amici* and their counsel made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief. Counsel of record for the parties have consented to the filing of this brief, and letters of consent have been filed with the clerk.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Amici agree with petitioners that this Court should grant certiorari on the first question presented in the petitions—whether limitations on expenditures by candidates for state political office invariably violate the First Amendment. The Circuits are in direct and acknowledged conflict on that question. In this case, the Second Circuit has held that expenditure limits are not inevitably foreclosed by this Court’s decision in *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), whereas the Sixth and Tenth Circuits have squarely held that *Buckley* categorically prohibits such laws. See *Homans v. City of Albuquerque*, 366 F.3d 900 (10th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 125 S. Ct. 625 (2004); *Kruse v. City of Cincinnati*, 142 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1998); *Suster v. Marshall*, 149 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 1998).

Although *amici* support review of the campaign expenditure question in the petitions, their reasons for doing so are markedly different from those set forth in the petitions for certiorari. In pressing their arguments for review, petitioners contend that the First Amendment, as interpreted and applied by this Court in *Buckley*, forecloses expenditure limits under any circumstances, and that this is a proper understanding of the First Amendment. *Amici* have a different view. Specifically, *amici* believe *Buckley* can and should be read to provide governments with the leeway to impose campaign expenditure limitations if supported by a record of compelling state interests sufficient to support the limitations. Even more fundamentally, *amici* believe the premises of *Buckley* regarding expenditure limitations are ripe for re-examination in light of the three decades of experience under the regime of campaign finance regulation dictated by *Buckley*.

As the Court recognized in *McConnell v. FEC*, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), nothing in the three decades of experience since *Buckley* calls into question the Court’s decision to uphold the legislative judgment that campaign contribution limits are essential to preserving the public’s faith in the electoral process and our representative institutions. Rather, the accumulated experience of Members of Congress, reinforced by empirical evidence, is that the dominance of money in politics continues to threaten the public’s faith in the legitimacy of government and in the elections that choose whom shall govern—notwithstanding the existence of contribution limits of the kind upheld in *Buckley*. The issue presented in this case is thus simply not about censorship. Here “constitutionally protected interests lie on both sides of the legal question.” *Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC*, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring). There must be leeway for the government to address the core societal interest, recognized by this Court, *see Buckley*, 424 U.S. at 26-27, in ensuring the integrity—in every sense of the word—of our representative system of government. In *Shrink Missouri*, and even more emphatically in *McConnell*, this Court reaffirmed the importance of the competing constitutional interests at stake in the arena of campaign finance regulation—and the compelling nature of the government’s interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process.

The instant case provides an appropriate opportunity for the Court to reassess the strength of governments’ interest in imposing candidate expenditure limitations in light of the experience of the last three decades under *Buckley*. *See Cf. FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.*, 533 U.S. 431, 442 n.8 (2001) (noting that, while the FEC had not asked the Court in that case to revisit expenditure limits,

“some have argued that such limits could be justified in light of post-*Buckley* developments in campaign finance”) (citations omitted). More generally, this case presents an appropriate occasion for the Court to make clear that the First Amendment does not hamstring legislators’ attempts to protect the viability of our very structure of government. “[F]or while the Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact” requiring Congress and state legislatures to stand helplessly by as the public’s faith in democracy withers away. See generally *Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez*, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).

The needed leeway can be provided, consistent with the First Amendment, in two ways. First, intermediate scrutiny should apply to any campaign finance reform that is justified by reference to something other than the communicative impact of speech. That is clear from this Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence since *Buckley*. See *Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC*, 512 U.S. 622, 641-43 (1994) (“*Turner I*”); *Ward v. Rock Against Racism*, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).

Second, legislatures should be given substantial deference in the design and enactment of campaign finance laws. *Buckley* provided such deference with regard to contribution limits, and the practical experience of *amici* since *Buckley* with respect to the financing of campaigns has demonstrated that deference is warranted for all such laws. Justice White was correct: the Court should defer to the “many seasoned professionals who have been deeply involved in elective processes and who have viewed them at close range over many years.” *Buckley*, 424 U.S. at 261 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court should allow vindication of the predictive judgments of legislatures as to what campaign finance laws are needed to sustain faith in the electoral process and enhance the

process of governance. As this Court has recognized, legislatures should not be held to a standard of proof that ““would necessitate that a State’s political system sustain some level of damage before the legislature could take corrective action.”” *Burson v. Freeman*, 504 U.S. 191, 209 (1992) (quoting *Munro v. Socialist Workers Party*, 479 U.S. 189, 195 (1986)).

REASONS FOR GRANTING REVIEW

This Court should grant certiorari to decide whether Vermont’s campaign expenditure limitations categorically violate the First Amendment.

1. Certiorari is warranted because there is a direct and acknowledged conflict between the Second Circuit’s decision in this case, and the decisions of the Sixth and Tenth Circuits, both of which have invalidated expenditure limitations on the ground that this Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment in *Buckley v. Valeo* categorically forecloses such limitations. Resolution of that conflict is a matter of pressing importance, not only for the State of Vermont and many state and local governments that are considering similar expenditure limitations, but also for *amici* and other members of Congress committed to continuing the process of electoral reform on the federal level.

As the Second Circuit recognized in this case, *Buckley* should not be read as imposing an inflexible bar on campaign spending limitations. Reading *Buckley* that way would be anomalous in First Amendment jurisprudence. Even direct content-based restrictions of speech may be sustained if they are a narrowly tailored means of achieving a compelling governmental interest—a point the Court has vindicated directly in the context of the electoral process in

Burson v. Freeman. Thus, where—as here—government can demonstrate the existence of compelling interests in support of campaign expenditure limitations, those limitations should be sustained if they are an appropriately narrowly tailored response to the problem that motivated their enactment. In this critical respect, the Second Circuit was correct and the Sixth and Tenth Circuits were in error in their interpretation of *Buckley*.

2. Moreover, although Vermont’s candidate expenditure limitation can withstand, and should be upheld, under *Buckley*’s articulation of the appropriate standard of review, *amici* submit that a more searching re-examination of *Buckley*’s analytical framework is in order. This Court’s jurisprudence since *Buckley* has made clear that “[t]he government’s *purpose* is the *controlling* consideration” in determining the standard of reviews for laws challenged on First Amendment grounds. *Ward*, 491 U.S. at 791 (emphasis added). Strict scrutiny applies only to “regulations enacted for the purpose of restraining speech on the basis of its content.” *City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.*, 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986). The more lenient requirements of intermediate scrutiny apply “to those cases in which the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression,” *Texas v. Johnson*, 491 U.S. 397, 407 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted), or where the legislation is “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.” *Renton*, 475 U.S. at 48 (quotation marks omitted); *see also Ward*, 491 U.S. at 791. This is true even if the regulation has “an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not [on] others.” *Ward*, 491 U.S. at 791. Indeed, intermediate scrutiny is appropriate for laws that may directly regulate speech activity, as long as the government’s justification for doing so is unrelated to the

content of the expression, limited by the regulation. *Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC*, 520 U.S. 180, 213-14 (1997) (“*Turner II*”).²

Because the appropriate standard of review depends on the government’s “overriding objective” in passing the challenged regulation, *see Turner I*, 512 U.S. at 646, campaign finance laws should be subjected to intermediate scrutiny if they are justified on grounds unrelated to the communicative impact of speech. This conclusion is consistent with *Buckley*. That case applied strict scrutiny to the independent expenditure limits at issue because those limits were justified on the basis of the communicative value of the speech. As this Court explained in *Turner I*, “[t]he Government [in *Buckley*] justified the law as a means of ‘equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections.’ . . . Because the [independent] expenditure limit in *Buckley* was designed to ensure that the political speech of the wealthy not drown out the speech of others, we found that it was concerned with the communicative impact of the regulated speech.” *Turner I*, 512 U.S. at 657-58 (quoting *Buckley*, 424 U.S. at 48).³

² The mere fact that campaign finance laws only address laws related to campaign financing does not mean such laws are aimed at the communicative impact of speech. In *Renton*, for example, this Court declined to apply strict scrutiny to a zoning restriction that directly burdened expression of a particular content—“adult” films—because the government’s “predominate concerns” in preventing “secondary effects” were unrelated to suppression of the regulated speech. *Renton*, 475 U.S. at 47 (quotation marks omitted).

³ The *Buckley* Court did reject an argument, premised on *United States v. O’Brien*, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), that regulation of contributions and expenditures was regulation of conduct, not speech. *See Shrink Missouri*, 528 U.S. at 386 (citing *Buckley*, 424 U.S. at 16). But that is hardly dispositive of *amici*’s argument in favor of intermediate scrutiny.

Accordingly, to determine the appropriate standard of review, a court must consider whether the justification offered by the government for the campaign finance law aims at the communicative impact of the speech affected.

A number of purposes that are unrelated to the communicative impact of speech motivate campaign finance laws—including candidate expenditure limitations of the kind at issue here. First and foremost, regulating campaign finance increases citizens’ faith and confidence in the political system. Efforts to restore faith in our representative government are unrelated to “the ideas or views expressed” by campaign contributions. *Turner I*, 512 U.S. at 643. As recognized, in *Buckley*, avoiding corruption or the appearance of corruption is necessary to serve this broader purpose; indeed, it is “critical . . . if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.” *Buckley*, 424 U.S. at 27 (quoting *United States Civil Serv. Comm’n v. National Ass’n of Letter Carriers*, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973); alteration in original); see also *McConnell*, 540 U.S. at 203-04 (reaffirming compelling interest in preserving citizenry’s faith in the electoral process).

Reforms also can be justified by the related need to address voter apathy. Studies have shown a correlation between the decrease in voter turnout and the increase in campaign spending. E. Joshua Rosenkranz, *Buckley Stops Here: Loosening the Judicial Stranglehold on Campaign Finance Reform* 17 (1998). Voter apathy, and alienation from the government in general, is exacerbated by a public perception of the pervasive influence of money in politics.

It has been clear at least since *Ward* that it is the government’s justification that is controlling. *Ward*, 491 U.S. at 791.

One study in Minnesota revealed that “almost one-third of those surveyed were less likely to vote or participate in politics because they believed that givers have more influence over elected officials than [non-givers] do.” David Schultz, *Proving Political Corruption: Documenting the Evidence Required to Sustain Campaign Finance Reform Laws*, 18 Rev. Litig. 85, 122 (Winter 1999). This Court has recognized that the government has a compelling interest in addressing this public disdain for the electoral process, in order “to sustain the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of government.” *United States v. International Union United Automobile Workers of Am.*, 352 U.S. 567, 575 (1957).

Additionally, reforms—and expenditure limits in particular—can be justified by a compelling content-neutral interest in preserving the quality of representation by eliminating the enormous burden of raising enormous campaign war chests. That this burden exists, and has come to dominate the professional lives of officeholders and candidates is not open to serious question. *See generally* Vincent A. Blasi, *Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate The First Amendment After All*, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1281 (1994). As *amici* can attest, the incessant demands of fund-raising substantially impairs elected representatives in fulfilling their professional duties. Elected officials spend so much time raising campaign funds that they do not have enough time remaining to master issues, communicate with constituents and perform other essential parts of their jobs. This interest is not merely important: it is of a constitutional dimension in its own right.

This problem is the direct result of the absence of limits on campaign spending. Moreover, the fundraising burden on

candidates is a direct outgrowth of *Buckley*. By upholding limitations on contributions while striking down spending limits, *Buckley* established a legal structure that has proven untenable. If legislators address the risk of corruption by imposing contribution limitations, they force officeholders and candidates to spend most of their time raising campaign funds. If they decide to free officeholders and candidates from this burden by eliminating contribution limits, they must endure the risk of actual and perceived corruption of the electoral process.

These justifications for reform address public concerns wholly unrelated to the communicative impact of campaign speech. As to preserving public confidence in the system and combating voter apathy, the problem is not the political message funded by a large contribution or expenditure, but rather the perceived significance of the very fact that a large amount of money is donated or spent. *Cf. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers*, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973) (upholding restrictions on federal employees' political activities justified in part on ensuring that "[public] confidence in the system of representative Government is not . . . eroded to a disastrous extent"). As to limiting the time candidates spend raising money, the problem is not the message any candidate seeks to fund, but rather the extent to which the fundraising process itself hampers the job performance of public servants. *Cf. Renton*, 475 U.S. at 47 (reviewing zoning restriction on "adult" theatres under intermediate scrutiny because the restriction was meant to control "the secondary effects of such theatres on the surrounding community").

3. More generally, the Court also should apply a deferential standard of proof that will allow vindication of legislative judgments of the necessity of campaign finance

laws. In First Amendment cases, this Court has carefully avoided “imposing judicial formulas so rigid that they become a straitjacket that disables government from responding to serious problems.” *Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC*, 518 U.S. 727, 741 (1996). That wisdom applies with particular force in the present context. The “choice of means” to protect the integrity of elections “presents a question primarily addressed to the judgment of Congress.” *Burroughs v. United States*, 290 U.S. 534, 547 (1934) (upholding the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925); *see also Letter Carriers*, 413 U.S. at 566. Therefore, if “the means adopted are really calculated to attain the end, the degree of their necessity, the extent to which they conduce to the end, the closeness of the relationship between the means adopted and the end to be attained, are matters for congressional determination alone.” *Burroughs*, 290 U.S. at 548.

This deference has been applied to laws regulating the electoral process even in the face of First Amendment challenges when, as here, significant competing government interests are at stake. For example, in *Burson*, the Court did not require stringent proof from the legislature to uphold a 100-foot boundary around polling places. *Burson*, 504 U.S. at 209. As *Burson* noted, “this Court never has held a State ‘to the burden of demonstrating empirically the objective effects on political stability that [are] produced’ by the voting regulation in question.” *Id.* at 208-09 (quoting *Munro v. Socialist Workers Party*, 479 U.S. 189, 195 (1986); alteration in original). There, the Court affirmed a campaign reform, even in the face of strict scrutiny, on the basis of “[a] long history, a substantial consensus, and simple common sense.” 504 U.S. at 211.

This deference is warranted in part because “it is difficult to isolate the exact effect” of campaign finance laws on the harms they are designed to address. *Id.* at 208. Deference is especially important where, as with many campaign finance laws, the justification for regulation is declining public faith in the electoral system—a problem that is inherently difficult to prove by direct evidence and that legislators are distinctly well-positioned to access. Moreover, the Court has recognized that it should not require that “a State’s political system sustain some level of damage before the legislature could take corrective action.” *Munro v. Socialist Workers Party*, 479 U.S. 189, 195 (1986). The Court therefore has provided deference to permit legislatures “to respond to potential deficiencies in the electoral process with foresight rather than reactively, provided that the response is reasonable and does not significantly impinge on constitutionally protected rights.” *Id.* at 195-96.

Accordingly, the *Buckley* Court went out of its way to defer broadly to legislative judgments about the need for contribution limits. The Court upheld the FECA contribution limits based not on anything Congress actually proved but merely because “Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence” justified restrictions on contributions. *Buckley*, 424 U.S. at 27. As to the threat of actual corruption, the *Buckley* Court relied on common sense in acknowledging the importance of fundraising to elections and the danger that donors might exchange campaign funds for political favors. *Id.* at 26-27. The Court did not demand actual evidence of corruption, noting only that examples cited by the Court of Appeals showed that “the problem [was] not an illusory one.” *Id.* at 27. Indeed, the Court declared that “the scope of such pernicious practices *can never be reliably ascertained.*”

Id. (emphasis added). Finally, *Buckley* admonished courts to avoid “fine tuning” of legislative limits on contributions. *Id.* at 30.

The Court has reiterated this deferential portion of *Buckley* in subsequent cases. See *FEC v. National Right To Work Comm.*, 459 U.S. 197, 209-10 (1982) (finding that congressional judgment about electoral laws “warrants considerable deference”); *id.* (Court will not “second guess a legislative determination as to the need for prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil feared”); *California Med. Ass’n v. FEC*, 453 U.S. 182, 199 (1981) (holding that contribution limit was “an appropriate means by which Congress could seek” to advance governmental interest). The Court made the same point in *Shrink Missouri*. Noting that “[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up and down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised,” the Court held it was “neither novel nor implausible” that large contributions present dangers of corruption and arouse voters’ suspicions in the integrity of the system. *Shrink Missouri*, 528 U.S. at 391. The Court therefore sustained the contribution limits without demanding much evidentiary proof, concluding “there is little reason to doubt that sometimes large contributions will work actual corruption of our political system, and no reason to question the existence of a corresponding suspicion among voters.” *Id.* at 395.⁴

⁴ The Court in *Shrink Missouri* relied upon an affidavit from a State Senator to the effect that large contributions have “the real potential to buy votes,” newspaper accounts of potential improprieties related to large campaign contributions, several campaign financing scandals cited by the Court of Appeals in another case, and a voter referendum reflecting support for contribution limits. *Id.* at 394-95.

This deference is appropriate, and should be afforded here. Legislatures, not courts, are institutionally better suited to assess the need for campaign finance laws and what types of laws will best address the declining faith of their constituents in the political process. And, as seasoned participants in that process, legislators have practical experience as to the potentially negative aspects of the campaign financing system and the best way to ameliorate them. As Justices Stevens and Ginsburg recognized in *Colorado Republican I*, “Congress surely has both wisdom and experience in these matters that is far superior to ours.” *Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC*, 518 U.S. 604, 650 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). “Where a legislature has significantly greater institutional expertise, as for example, in the field of election regulation, the Court in practice defers to empirical legislative judgments.” *Shrink Missouri*, 528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring). The Court must allow vindication of the predictive judgments of legislatures that reforms are needed to address compelling government interests, interests that are themselves of constitutional magnitude.

The first-hand experience of *amici* indicates that the campaign laws upheld in *Buckley* are insufficient, by themselves, to stop the decline of voter confidence in the integrity of the electoral process. And the regime *Buckley* put in place has had the perverse consequence of burdening officeholders and candidates with the ceaseless task of fundraising to ensure adequate war chests—a burden that is eroding the quality of representative government in this country even as it erodes the public’s faith in their elected officials. At the same time, the Court should not overestimate the impact that campaign finance laws have on First Amendment interests on the other side of the balance.

Even though the purpose of a reform is unrelated to the communicative impact of speech, the effect can be to enhance, rather than to restrict, the interests protected by the First Amendment. “It is quite wrong to assume that the net effect of limits on contributions and expenditures—which tend to protect equal access to the political arena, to free candidates and their staffs from the interminable burden of fund-raising, and to diminish the importance of repetitive 30-second commercials—will be adverse to the interest in informed debate protected by the First Amendment.” *Colorado Republican I*, 518 U.S. at 649-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant review of the question whether Vermont’s campaign expenditure limitations violate the First Amendment.

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